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Abstract. We introduce ShapeAdv, a novel framework to study shape-
aware adversarial perturbations that reflect the underlying shape varia-
tions (e.g., geometric deformations and structural differences) in the 3D
point cloud space. We develop shape-aware adversarial 3D point cloud at-
tacks by leveraging the learned latent space of a point cloud auto-encoder
where the adversarial noise is applied in the latent space. Specifically, we
propose three different variants including an exemplar-based one by guid-
ing the shape deformation with auxiliary data, such that the generated
point cloud resembles the shape morphing between objects in the same
category. Different from prior works, the resulting adversarial 3D point
clouds reflect the shape variations in the 3D point cloud space while still
being close to the original one. In addition, experimental evaluations on
the ModelNet40 benchmark demonstrate that our adversaries are more
difficult to defend with existing point cloud defense methods and exhibit
a higher attack transferability across classifiers. Our shape-aware adver-
sarial attacks are orthogonal to existing point cloud based attacks and
shed light on the vulnerability of 3D deep neural networks.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) [35, 37, 53] have achieved state-of-the-art per-
formance in various 3D perception tasks [6, 24, 34, 36, 43, 69] and have been
widely applied in safety-critical applications including robotic grasping [28, 62]
and autonomous driving [44, 63]. However, several recent studies [7, 48, 57, 59]
raised concerns regarding the vulnerability of DNNs when applied to 3D sen-
sory data such as point clouds. For example, carefully crafted adversarial 3D
point clouds can induce arbitrary prediction errors in modern platforms. Recent
works [26, 57, 65] proposed several heuristics to construct adversarial 3D point
clouds by injecting adversarial noise directly to the victim object. Among the
heuristics, attacks based on independent point shifting or addition can be re-
solved by statistical denoising or outlier removal mechanisms [68], while attacks
based on adding adversarial clusters or objects fail to capture shape variations
of a certain 3D point cloud due to significant changes to the true shape of the
victim object. Indeed, modeling shape variations of a 3D point cloud is chal-
lenging as it requires reasoning about the structural factors (e.g., two chair legs
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Fig. 1: An overview of the proposed shape-aware adversarial 3D point cloud gen-
eration. We propose a novel framework to inject adversarial noise into 3D point
cloud by leveraging the latent space of a point cloud auto-encoder. Our method
first learns the latent representations with a point cloud auto-encoder in an un-
supervised way through point reconstruction. Second, we propose three different
methods (ShapeAdv-Latent `2, ShapeAdv-Chamfer and ShapeAdv-Auxiliary) to
inject perturbations in the latent space and generate the adversarial 3D point
cloud using the decoder network. Our ShapeAdv is orthogonal to existing at-
tack methods including shifting points, adding independent point perturbations,
adding clusters and objects.
are connected by a horizontal bar), geometric factors (e.g., length of the chair
leg), and the interactions in between. At the same time, understanding the fail-
ure modes of DNNs towards adversarial 3D perturbations which reflect shape
variations in the point cloud space is an important but under-explored.
In this work, we are interested in generating shape-aware adversarial point
perturbations to an existing 3D point cloud. More specifically, we would like
our perturbations to reflect certain shape variations in local geometry, global
geometry, or structures while keeping the overall shape close to the original
3D point cloud. We propose a two-stage framework to generate shape-aware
adversarial examples or ShapeAdv by leveraging a widely used point cloud auto-
encoder network [1, 18, 64]. First, we learn to encode the high-dimensional 3D
point cloud data into a lower-dimensional compact representation in the latent
space through unsupervised shape reconstruction. As the auto-encoder network
is well trained to reconstruct input shape, the learned latent space contains
essential geometry and structure information about the 3D object shape that
approximates the shape manifold. Second, we propose to add perturbation in
the latent space and use our decoder network to propagate the signal to the
3D point cloud space. Consequently, a small perturbation on the latent space
would cause a small change on the point space, so that the resulting point cloud
is still close to the input shape. This is different from the previous approaches
which directly add an adversarial noise to the point space. Our method is also
supported by the empirical finding [1, 15, 55, 64] that linear interpolation on the
learned latent space can produce smooth and continuous shape morphing.
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Furthermore, we extend the proposed framework by incorporating auxiliary
point clouds from the same category as the input when generating adversarial
attacks. As multiple shapes are used to restrict the shape of the adversary, the
generated adversarial shape resembles both the input and auxiliary point clouds.
Finally, we demonstrate that auto-encoders can also be used for adversarial
defense for 3D point clouds.
To show the effectiveness of our method, we attack the commonly used Point-
Net classifier [35] on the ModelNet40 [43, 56] dataset. We compare our proposed
attacks with previous methods: adding or shifting points, and adding clusters
or objects [57]. While all attacks can achieve 100% attack success rate, we ob-
serve that our attacks are hard to defend against compared to simple baseline
attacks which introduce only a few outliers; on the other hand, adding clusters
or objects significantly change the geometry of the input. We experiment with
two different auto-encoder networks, namely, the MLP baseline [1] and Atlas-
Net [18]. Our results show that AtlasNet preserves the detail of shapes as it
generates adversarial point clouds by deforming the local surfaces which can be
partially removed by existing defense methods. In comparison, the MLP base-
line generates a global geometric deformation as the adversarial perturbation,
which makes the defense challenging. We consider this as a trade-off between the
expressive power of point decoder and the strength of adversarial perturbations.
Finally, we show that our proposed attacks improve black-box transferability to
other models, such as PointNet++ [37] and DGCNN [53].
To summarize, the contributions of our shape-aware adversarial 3D point
cloud generation are as follows:
– We introduce a novel framework for generating shape-aware adversarial 3D
point clouds by injecting an adversarial noise in the latent space of a point
auto-encoder.
– We propose three different variants to generate such shape-aware attacks
with different additional constraint: by minimizing the difference between
the input and adversary in either the point space or latent space, and also
by incorporating auxiliary point clouds from the same category with the
input in the constraint.
– We illustrate that the injected shape-aware perturbation reflects certain
shape variations (e.g., geometric deformation or structural difference) in the
3D point cloud space.
– Compared to existing point cloud attack methods that directly operate in
the raw point cloud space, the proposed attack methods are significantly
more difficult to defend against with existing defense methods and exhibit
higher attack transferability.
2 Related work
Deep 3D shape generation. Generative 3D shape modeling [4, 5] has become a
popular research topic in machine learning, computer vision, and graphics. The
past few years have witnessed tremendous advances in deep generative modeling
of 3D voxels [11, 15, 54, 55, 56, 61], point clouds [1, 12, 14, 18, 20, 29, 64, 66],
4 Authors Suppressed Due to Excessive Length
and surface meshes [16, 23, 25, 27, 50, 51, 52, 70]. Wu et al. [56] introduced the
first deep generative models on 3D volumetric shapes using stacked Restricted
Boltzmann Machines with 3D convolutions operating on 3D occupancy grids.
[15, 54, 55, 61] extended this framework with encoder-decoder 3D convolutional
architectures and in-network LSTM modules [11].
Due to several practical challenges (e.g., memory and computationally ex-
pensive 3D convolution operations) in generating high-fidelity 3D voxels, most
recent works have shifted the focus to generative modeling of point clouds. Com-
pared to the voxel representation, operations in point clouds are computationally
more efficient; for example, the dimension of voxel fits 3D convolution, while that
of point clouds fits 1D convolution. However, point clouds require permutation-
invariant operations because the order of points can be random, which limits a
straightforward transfer from other domains. Fan et al. [12] introduced a deep
learning-based framework to synthesize 3D point cloud from a single image using
the Chamfer distance and Earth mover’s distance to better preserve the shape
invariance under point permutation. Achlioptas et al. [1] proposed a two-step
training method for an auto-encoder, for learning latent representation space of
3D point clouds and generating 3D point clouds from the latent representation.
To improve the MLP based point auto-encoder, Groueix et al. [18] generates 3D
point clouds in a piece-wise planar fashion where each planar surface is deformed
by a separate neural network. Our proposed shape-aware adversarial method can
be crafted with different architectures, as point auto-encoder is a widely used
architecture for shape reconstruction and generation. Besides 3D point cloud
representation, the idea of generating an adversarial attack on the latent space
can potentially be applicable to other 3D data representations, such as voxel
grids and surface meshes.
Adversarial examples. Early studies [17, 49] have revealed the vulnerability of
modern image classifiers by carefully crafted adversarial examples, which can
induce arbitrary prediction errors while being imperceptible by human. This is
achieved by optimizing an objective that maximizes the prediction errors while
restricting the perturbation magnitude under an `p norm. Adversarial attacks
have gained tremendous attentions in machine learning, computer vision, and
security communities with two parallel efforts focused on generating adversar-
ial attacks [9, 31, 32, 33, 58, 67] and devising effective defenses against such
mechanisms [8, 19, 21, 30, 39, 41, 42, 60, 62] on natural images.
While adversarial examples in the 2D image domain have been extensively
studied, generating 3D adversarial examples is relatively under-explored. Xiao
et al. [59] introduced a method to inject adversarial 3D shape deformations to a
victim object so as to fool the 2D object detectors when projecting into the 2D
image space using a differentiable renderer. Cao et al. [7] further investigated
machine learning-based LiDAR spoofing attacks in the real world. Recently, sev-
eral works [26, 48, 57, 65] have investigated the problem of generating adversarial
signals on the raw 3D point clouds. For example, among the attacks proposed
by [57], adding or shifting few points is easily defended by outlier removal meth-
ods [26, 68], and adding a few clusters or objects makes a significant difference
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from the original shape, such that an appropriate preprocessing or segmentation
stage can remove them.
Unlike prior works that generate adversarial noises directly in the point cloud
space, our work injects adversarial perturbations on the learned shape manifold
using latent representation of a point auto-encoder, such that the adversary
reflects the shape variations of a 3D point cloud. Our work is also related to
recent studies on semantic or “unrestricted” adversarial examples in the image
domain [2, 3, 13, 22, 38, 46, 47] using generative models. To the best of our
knowledge, the proposed shape-aware adversarial point cloud generation frame-
work is the first study on 3D point cloud adversaries in a shape-aware fashion
using the latent space of a point cloud auto-encoder.
3 ShapeAdv: Shape-Aware Adversarial Attacks
In this section, we describe our proposed ShapeAdv attacks and defense methods.
3.1 Background
Adversarial attacks on 3D point clouds. A 3D point cloud x ∈ X ⊂ ⋃∞n=1Rn×3
is a set of N points sampled from the surface of an object, where each point
is represented by a tuple of Cartesian coordinates (XYZ) in the point space X .
Let M : X → Y be a classification model, which takes a 3D point cloud x as
an input and predicts its label y ∈ Y ⊂ Z. Since the number of points N and
their order vary depending on the sampling, M is designed to be invariant to
the dimension of N , usually achieved by a global max pool or average pool
operation [35, 53].
Given a point cloud data and its ground truth label (x, y), the goal of an
adversarial attack is to leadM to misclassify the label of an input x, by finding
an adversary x′ satisfying:
min
x′
D(x, x′) s.t. M(x′) 6= y, (1)
where D is a distance metric to measure the similarity between the original
data x and the optimized adversary x′. In targeted attacks, a target label t 6= y
is provided such that the adversary is optimized to satisfy M(x′) = t, while
M(x′) 6= y is sufficient in untargeted attacks.
In adversarial attacks on 3D point clouds, two types of strategies have been
studied [26, 48, 57, 65]: adversarial point perturbation and adversarial point
generation. Adversarial point perturbation adds a small perturbation δ to x,
i.e., x′ = x + δ, while adversarial point generation augments Naug points to x,
i.e., x′ = [x; δ] ∈ R(N+Naug)×3.
Learned latent space as an approximation to the shape manifold. Different from
prior works, we propose to inject an adversarial perturbation to the latent rep-
resentation of a point cloud. To achieve this, we take an auto-encoder G =
Gdec ◦ Genc, which consists of an encoder network Genc and a decoder network
Gdec. In this setting, given a data and its label (x, y), we optimize the adversary
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in the latent space z′ to be similar to the encoded data z = Genc(x), such that it
leads the model M to misclassify the decoded output x′ = Gdec(z′). Similar to
Eq. (1), we optimize the following:
min
z′
D(z, z′) s.t. M(x′) 6= y, (2)
where D is a distance metric to measure the similarity between the input and its
adversary in the latent space. For this purpose, any auto-encoder is applicable,
but a high-quality auto-encoder would produce better quality of the generated
adversarial attack, i.e., D(x,G(x)) should be small enough for any x ∈ X .
3.2 Shape-Aware Adversarial Attacks in the Latent Space
Since Eq. (2) could not be directly optimized via gradient descent, we reformulate
the optimization problem as:
min
z′
Ladv(y,M(x′)) + λD(z, z′), (3)
where λ controls the balance between the adversarial loss and the similarity
between the input and the adversary, D is the distance metric, z = Genc(x) is
the latent representation of the input data, and x′ = Gdec(z′) is the adversary in
the point space X . Here, any adversarial loss can be applicable, but we follow the
most effective formulation of the CW attack [9], as described below: let l(x)y′
be the logits (or unnormalized probabilities) predicted by the model M that x
is from the label y′, such that M(x) = arg maxy′ l(x)y′ . Then, for a targeted
attack,
LTadv(y,M(x′)) = (max
y′ 6=t
l(x′)y′ − l(x′)t)+, (4)
and for an untargeted attack,
LUadv(y,M(x′)) = (l(x′)y −max
y′ 6=y
l(x′)y′)+, (5)
where (·)+ = max(·, 0) is the hinge loss. In the following, we specify different
choices of the regularization D in our approach.
Shape-aware attack in the latent space. It is straightforward to minimize the
difference between the input and the adversary in the latent space. We then
solve the following optimization problem:
min
z′
Ladv(y,M(x′)) + λ‖z − z′‖2, (6)
where x′ = Gdec(z′) is the decoded adversary. We regularize z and z′ to be close
with respect to `2 distance. To distinguish with other proposed methods, we
refer to this method as ShapeAdv-Latent `2.
ShapeAdv: Generating Shape-Aware Adversarial 3D Point Clouds 7
Shape-aware attack in the point space. In ShapeAdv-Latent `2, we implicitly
assume that local similarity is preserved: i.e., as long as z′ is similar to z, the
adversary x′ is also similar to x. Alternatively, we can directly constrain the
similarity between the decoded adversary x′ and the input x, as our point de-
coder Gdec is differentiable. More specifically, let x = [x1, x2, . . . , xN ]> and x′ =
[x′1, x
′
2, . . . , x
′
N ′ ]
> be the collection of points in the input and adversary, respec-
tively. We apply the squared Chamfer distanceD2CH(x, x′) = 1‖x′‖0
∑
x′j
minxi‖xi−
x′j‖22 + 1‖x‖0
∑
xi
minx′j‖xi − x′j‖22 as the metric, which is permutation-invariant
and effective in approximating the shape manifold of 3D point cloud data [12]:1
min
z′
Ladv(y,M(x′)) + λD2CH(x, x′), (7)
where x′ = Gdec(z′) ∈ X is the decoded adversary. We refer to this method as
ShapeAdv-Chamfer.
Shape-aware attack with auxiliary point clouds. In the above two methods, we
optimize the adversarial perturbation in any direction in the latent space. How-
ever, if the quality of the latent space is not perfect, the perturbation in the
latent space would cause an undesirable perturbation in the point space. To
avoid such perturbation in the point space, we propose to leverage auxiliary
point clouds sampled from the category of the input to guide the direction in
the latent space. Specifically, given a pair of data and its label (x, y), we find K
nearest training data whose label is y.2 Let x0 = x be the input data and its
nearest neighbor training data be {x1, x2, · · · , xK}. We then solve the following
optimization problem:
min
z′
Ladv(y,M(x′)) + λ
K + 1
K∑
k=0
D2CH(xk, x′), (8)
where x′ = Gdec(z′) ∈ X is the decoded adversary. The coefficient 1/(K + 1) in
the second term could be a tunable hyperparameter to give different weights to
the input and auxiliary point clouds, but we could not find significant differences
in terms of the attack performance quantitatively. We refer to this method as
ShapeAdv-Auxiliary.
To analyze the adversary x′ generated by this attack, suppose we have only
one auxiliary point cloud. Then minimizing the second term in Eq. (8) forces
x′ to be similar to both the input data x and the auxiliary point cloud x1,
and its optimal value is expected to be a linear interpolation between them.
We note that this holds in a valid metric only. Since the Chamfer distance is
not a valid metric, the triangle inequality does not hold in general, such that
the optimal value may not be a linear interpolation of x and x′. However, we
1 Strictly speaking, the Chamfer distance is not a valid metric because it does not
satisfy the triangle inequality. However, it is empirically shown to be effective.
2 We use the Chamfer distance in the point space to find the K nearest neighbors.
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use the Chamfer distance here, because we found that its qualitative results
empirically follow our analysis and show a good performance. In general, when
we take K auxiliary point clouds, the adversary x′ would expected to be in a
convex polyhedron Ω(x0, x1, x2, ..., xK). Therefore, this formulation also serves
as a method to analyze the robustness of the classifier under shape deformation
in the same class; in other words, if such an adversary exists, then the model is
not robust to shape deformation.
On the other hand, we can restrict the search space of adversary in the latent
space z′ to be a convex polyhedron Ω(z0, z1, z2, ..., zK). In this case, we no longer
need the second term in Eq. (8) and z′ is formulated as a convex combination
of the input and the auxiliary point clouds, i.e., z′ =
∑K
k=0 αkzk where αk is
optimizable. However, we empirically found that such formulation is not very
effective.
3.3 Shape-Aware Adversarial Defense
While we focused on using point auto-encoders to generate attacks, they can
also be used to defend against adversarial point clouds. First, as our latent
space approximates the shape manifold, adversarial attacks out of the shape
manifold can be projected on the shape manifold when it is encoded by Genc,
such that the output decoded by Gdec may not have an adversarial perturbation;
in other words, auto-encoding has an effect of noise removal, if the noise is out
of the shape manifold. Therefore, given a test input xtest which can be either a
clean or adversarial data, xˆtest = G(xtest) is the defended output, such that the
prediction after defense yˆtest can be expressed as
yˆtest = (M◦ G)(xtest). (9)
Similar defense mechanisms have also been studied in recent works [19, 21,
41, 42, 45, 47], which mostly focused on evaluating their method in a small
2D image dataset, such as MNIST. In contrast to the 2D image representation,
the 3D point cloud we study in this paper is a collection of unordered points
irregularly distributed in the 3D, which makes the defense challenging. We refer
to this defense method as PointAE Defense.
4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we compare our shape-aware attacks with the state-of-the-art
attack methods for 3D point clouds against different defense mechanisms.
4.1 Experimental Setup
Datasets and 3D models. We conduct our experiments on the 3D point cloud
classification benchmark aligned ModelNet40 [43, 56], and follow the same exper-
imental settings as reported in [57]. This dataset consists of 12, 311 CAD models
from 40 common object categories, where 9, 843 objects are used for training
and 2, 468 are for testing.3 We uniformly sample 1, 024 points on the surface of
3 The compared methods and ours do not require validation, as they are optimization-
based.
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Classifier / Defense Clean SOR [68] PointAE-MLP PointAE-AtlasNet
PointNet 88.7% 88.5% 86.8% 87.4%
PointNet++ 92.7% 92.4% 85.0% 86.4%
DGCNN 91.0% 90.8% 83.7% 85.6%
Different initialization 90.3% 90.0% 86.0% 86.9%
Table 1: Classification accuracy on ModelNet40 with PointAE Defense in Eq. (9).
each object in the point space in the Cartesian coordinate (XYZ), and normal-
ize them into a unit ball by centering and scaling. To evaluate the performance
of adversarial attacks, we follow the protocol in [57] for targeted attack, which
uses 2, 250 victim-target pairs sampled from 10 major categories (airplane, bed,
bookshelf, bottle, chair, monitor, sofa, table, toilet, and vase). For untargeted
attacks, we use all the 2, 468 testing examples.
The victim model for adversarial attack is the popular PointNet [35], which
has shown the state-of-the-art performance in many tasks. For the attack trans-
ferability analysis, we also use PointNet++ [37] and DGCNN [53] as additional
3D point cloud classification models. We train the 3D point cloud classification
models by minimizing the standard cross-entropy loss on aligned ModelNet40.
To learn the mapping from raw 3D point cloud data to the latent space,
we leverage the point cloud auto-encoder (PointAE) with a latent space with
128 dimension approximating the shape manifold. Here, we consider two dif-
ferent architectures of PointAE proposed in different literature: MLP [1] and
AtlasNet [18]. We pre-train PointAE on ShapeNetCore [10]; because the dis-
tribution of categories in ModelNet40 is highly imbalanced, training only on
ModelNet40 leads to a severe performance downgrade. We note that PointAE-
MLP was also trained on ShapeNetCore in [1]. In summary, we pre-train the
PointAE on ShapeNetCore [10] using more than 51, 300 object instances and
fine-tune the auto-encoder on the aligned ModelNet40 dataset for 700 epochs.
We find that such shape pre-training is crucial to learn a good latent space with
a low reconstruction error, and effective shape deformation and interpolation in
the latent space.
Attack and defense methods. We compare the state-of-the-art adversarial attacks
for 3D point clouds with our proposed methods. Point shifting attack (Shift-
Point) [57] perturbs the victim point cloud on the point space while minimizing
the perturbation magnitude under the `2 constraint. Point addition attacks [57]
introduce new points to the original victim point cloud, where we compare three
strategies: (1) adding a number of points independently (Add-Point), (2) adding
several clusters of points (Add-Cluster), and (3) adding several point clouds from
another object belonging to a different category (Add-Object).
As described in Section 3, we introduce three variants of the shape-aware
adversarial attacks by injecting adversarial perturbations in the latent space.
We additionally constrain the perturbation by (1) minimizing the `2 distance in
the latent space (ShapeAdv-Latent `2), (2) minimizing the Chamfer distance in
the point space (ShapeAdv-Chamfer), and (3) minimizing the Chamfer distance
10 Authors Suppressed Due to Excessive Length
Attack Type Targeted Untargeted
Attack / Decoder MLP AtlasNet MLP AtlasNet
Latent `2 (Eq. (6)) 2.99 / 8.56 / 14.75 1.97 / 4.29 / 6.59 2.99 / 6.26 / 11.12 1.44 / 3.26 / 5.52
Chamfer (Eq. (7)) 2.14 / 4.55 / 8.82 1.46 / 3.15 / 5.15 1.36 / 3.47 / 5.68 1.00 / 2.70 / 4.42
Auxiliary (Eq. (8)) 2.47 / 5.16 / 9.61 2.25 / 4.12 / 6.10 1.46 / 4.61 / 8.27 1.20 / 3.86 / 6.46
Table 2: Quantitative evaluation of ShapeAdv under targeted attacks. We re-
port the perturbation magnitude in the Chamfer distance (×10−3) (the lower
the better). We report three different metrics: best, average and worst. We note
that the attack success rate of all methods is 100%.
from the auxiliary point clouds sampled from the category of the input as well
as the input (ShapeAdv-Auxiliary).
For the defense experiments, we consider the sparse outlier removal (SOR) [40,
68] and our proposed auto-encoder based method. SOR is a simple defense
method that removes outlier points in the point space, which is shown to be
effective in [68]; for each point, it first computes the average distance from its
k-nearest neighbors, and then filters out points if the average distance is larger
than µ + c · σ, where µ and σ are the mean and standard deviation of the av-
erage distances, and k and c are hyperparameters. We set the hyperparameters
to be k = 2 and c = 2.5, which is more conservative than the original paper [68]
and shows a strong defense performance against the adversarial point clouds. In
PointAE Defense, as described in Section 3.3, each point cloud in the test dataset
is auto-encoded and then considered as an input of the classification model, as
in Eq. (9). Specifically, for each point cloud in the test dataset, we use the
reconstruction-based method described in Section 3.3: using the direct output
from the encoder model for decoding as in Eq. (9), referred as PointAE Defense.
To show the classification performance after applying defense mechanisms, we
report the test accuracy with the reconstructed point clouds in Table 1.
Evaluation metrics. We use both attack success rate as well as the perturba-
tion magnitude measure (using the Chamfer distance) as our major evaluation
metrics. For attack success rate, we compute the number of successfully attacked
object instances divided by the total number. For the Chamfer distance measure,
we report the quantitative results in the best, average, and worst performance
over category-wise performances, as some category pairs are more difficult to at-
tack than others. The best case represents the most easily attacked victim class,
average case for attacking all classes, and worst case for the most difficult class.
4.2 Experimental Results
Overall analysis: shape-aware adversarial attacks. First, we measure the attack
success rate of our ShapeAdv methods under both targeted and untargeted set-
tings, and found that the attack success rate is 100% for all methods. We re-
port the perturbation magnitude in the Chamfer distance in Table 2. Overall,
adversarial point clouds generated by the AtlasNet [18] have relatively small
perturbations compared to the MLP baseline [1]. Compared to the other vari-
ants, our ShapeAdv-Chamfer achieves the lowest distance, as it is directly used
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Fig. 2: Qualitative comparison of ShapeAdv with PointAE-MLP and PointAE-
AtlasNet under targeted attacks. As both models generate perceptually plau-
sible point clouds, the adversaries of PointAE-AtlasNet preserve more details.
ShapeAdv
Auxiliary
Bottle Chair Monitor Sofa Table Vase
Input
Auxiliary
PointAE-
MLP
PointAE-
AtlasNet
Fig. 3: Qualitative results of ShapeAdv Auxiliary under untargeted attacks.
The adversaries resemble both the input and the auxiliary point clouds.
in the optimization objective when generating the adversarial attacks. In par-
ticular, our ShapeAdv-Auxiliary generates attacks that deviate further from the
original shape as we use one more auxiliary point cloud to guide the shape de-
formation, such that the distance to the original shape is not always minimized.
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Evaluation Metric Attack Success Rate (%) (↑) Chamfer distance (×10−3) (↓)
Attack / Defense SOR [40] AE-MLP AE-AtlasNet No Def. SOR [40] AE-MLP AE-AtlasNet
Shift-Point [57] 10.0 9.6 9.5 0.15 0.78 4.51 3.91
Add-Point [57] 7.8 10.3 9.8 0.09 0.62 5.13 4.20
Add-Cluster [57] 63.5 53.2 34.0 17.60 19.21 22.23 12.42
Add-Object [57] 68.3 37.1 31.0 12.16 13.86 15.36 10.81
MLP-Latent `2 (Eq. (6)) 34.4 24.7 23.4 8.56 9.60 9.84 9.37
MLP-Chamfer (Eq. (7)) 20.8 14.6 15.1 4.55 5.63 5.74 5.59
Atlas-Latent `2 (Eq. (6)) 15.8 11.2 12.7 4.29 4.82 5.59 5.02
Atlas-Chamfer (Eq. (7)) 15.4 10.8 10.4 3.15 3.90 5.03 4.38
Table 3: Quantitative evaluation of targeted attacks in terms of attack success
rate (%) and the Chamfer distance (×10−3). ↑ (↓) implies that the higher (lower)
number is the better. We compare our shape-aware attacks with existing attacks
against SOR [40, 68] and our AE defenses extended from Defense-GAN [41].
As in Table 2, the trend is consistent in both targeted and untargeted settings,
while untargeted attacks are relatively easier to accomplish than targeted ones.
In Figure 2, we visualize our adversarial examples for targeted attacks. Both
methods generate perceptually plausible 3D point clouds similar to the shape of
the original one with noticeable shape deformations. AtlasNet tends to preserve
local geometric details of the original point cloud; the MLP baseline tends to gen-
erate a coarse shape of the same semantic category while being slightly different
from the original point cloud. Compared to ShapeAdv-Chamfer which uses the
Chamfer distance objective, examples generated by ShapeAdv-Latent `2 have
relatively larger deformations, which is consistent with the distance measure in
our quantitative evaluation. Taking account of its better visualization, we use
AtlasNet for ShapeAdv below, unless otherwise stated.
Deformation attacks with auxiliary point clouds. As seen in Figure 3, the de-
formed shapes guided by auxiliary point clouds under adversarial attacks are
perceptually similar to both input and auxiliary point cloud in one or several
aspects. Moreover, this attack works in a more controllable fashion in which
the deformation can be guided by the geometry and structure of auxiliary point
cloud. For example, in the third column of Figure 3, the method is able to gen-
erate an adversarial chair without chair arms from the input chair with two
arms. This can be potentially useful when analyzing the robustness of modern
3D point cloud classifiers given a specific shape deformation.
Shape-aware adversarial attacks against defense methods. We compare our shape-
aware attacks with existing point cloud attack methods proposed by [57] and
visualize the results in Figure 4. We evaluate the proposed shape-aware attacks
against two defense methods including sparse outlier removal (SOR) [68] and our
auto-encoder based defense method, which can also be interpreted as Defense-
GAN [41] on 3D point clouds. SOR is designed to remove point outliers from the
raw point cloud while our AE-based method performs the defense through the
auto-encoder. As in Table 3, our shape-aware adversarial attacks are generally
more difficult to defend than the existing point perturbation attacks and attacks
based on adding individual points. Compared to them, adversarial point clouds
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Attack
Method
Airplane → Bottle Bottle → Chair Chair → Airplane
Front Side Front Top Front Side
No Attack
Shift-
Point [57]
Add-
Point [57]
Add-
Cluster [57]
Add-
Object [57]
ShapeAdv
Latent `2
(Ours)
ShapeAdv
Chamfer
(Ours)
Fig. 4: Qualitative comparison of ShapeAdv and prior works under targeted
attacks. ShapeAdv methods generate perceptually plausible point clouds without
introducing significant outliers.
generated by our shape-aware attacks have noticeable geometric deformations
as we do not use point-to-point correspondences to constrain the perturbation.
Also, our methods exhibit different statistics compared to attacks by adding
points from point clusters or objects, as the resulting shapes from those meth-
ods are severely deformed from the origin ones (the Chamfer distance is higher).
In summary, we believe that our shape-aware adversarial attacks are orthogonal
to existing adversarial attacks on point clouds.
Comparisons between the two architectures (MLP and AtlasNet) demon-
strate that ShapeAdv generated by the MLP baseline is relatively harder to
defend against compared to AtlasNet. First, this implies that AtlasNet tends
to inject adversarial perturbations on the local geometry surfaces which can be
partially removed by the existing defense methods, while the MLP baseline tends
to inject global deformations as adversarial perturbations which makes the de-
fense challenging. When it comes to 3D point cloud reconstruction, AtlasNet
is more expressive and detail-preserving with a patch-based decoder that con-
14 Authors Suppressed Due to Excessive Length
PointNet++ DGCNN PointNet∗
Shift-Point [57] 3.9% 1.9% 5.5%
Add-Point [57] 3.6% 7.4% 7.8%
MLP-Latent `2 (Eq. (6)) 24.7% 23.5% 13.9%
MLP-Chamfer (Eq. (7)) 16.6% 17.4% 10.8%
MLP-Auxiliary (Eq. (8)) 13.5% 14.8% 6.5%
Atlas-Latent `2 (Eq. (6)) 13.6% 14.2% 11.6%
Atlas-Chamfer (Eq. (7)) 13.9% 13.0% 11.0%
Atlas-Auxiliary (Eq. (8)) 10.8% 11.8% 7.7%
Table 4: Attack success rates of untargeted transfer attacks against Point-
Net++ [37], DGCNN [53], augmented PointNet, and PointNet with a different
weight initialization (PointNet∗).
structs the piecewise planar surfaces, where each planar surface is independent
from each other (each patch is generated by a separate deformation-based de-
coder with different model weights). However, the detail-preserving adversaries
can be possibly considered as outliers by the point defense methods. Second,
existing defense methods consistently fail at defending against adversaries with
global geometric deformation or structure difference while being effective against
adversary with only local geometric deformation.
Shape-aware attack transferability. Regarding the safety-critical concerns re-
lated to the PointNet model [35], we further extend our study on black-box
attack transferability. Basically, we study how well the attacks generated by our
shape-aware attack methods can be transferred to other classifiers such as Point-
Net++ [37] and DGCNN [53]. As in Table 4, our latent-space `2 attacks exhibit
stronger transferability compared to all existing methods. Here, we exclude the
comparisons with methods that generate additional clusters or objects as they
lead to severe shape deformation to the original object shapes.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the robustness of 3D point cloud classifiers by ex-
ploiting the shape-aware adversarial attacks. In particular, we proposed to inject
adversarial perturbations to the learned latent space of a point auto-encoder as
an approximation to the shape manifold. By introducing shape deformations in
the latent space, we are able to explore shape variations of a certain class in the
adversarial point cloud generation. We then extended our shape-aware attacks
by guiding the shape deformation with auxiliary point clouds, which reflects
the process of shape morphing in the latent space. Moreoever, we have shown
that the learned latent representation is directly applicable to a defense method
against perturbations away from it. We believe our shape-aware adversarial at-
tacks are orthogonal to existing attacks generated directly on the point cloud,
which can broaden the landscape of adversarial robustness on 3D point cloud.
Besides 3D point cloud representation, the idea of generating adversary on the
latent space can potentially be applicable to other 3D data representations, such
as voxel grid and surface mesh.
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